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JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The Cowl has jUii^ viK m.. .A n\\>, appeal unuc 
DETERMINATIV E CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
onlv determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules in this case are 
Utah Rules ot Ci\ il Prooeduie If JiiJ l ( I t : i v l e v . m l l r \ t t i l w h i . li t \\ - -1 • • • I I l l / 
Argument ^reti HI i if ((us hnrl 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a dispute betwee. r:^,.i,. .. . 
("Noel Minion u r<"ni ' \ppe .*- ^ Miei i >ciuidaiii and Appellor; 
Almon Milner Covey ("Almon Milner Co\ ey" (n Anixilanf K In September 1991, 
Almon Milner Covey asked his sister to loan hiin ...
 t ,;»«.,. ^,, ^ ,, . : 
( .. -.;, v - . .lation Agreement. 
rl I ill nijH'vnneol contemplated that the only circumstance under which the Sears stock 
would be lost was if there was a margin call1 on Almon Milner Covey's account at his 
brokerage firm. t'o\e> k, i o ,\i an nines Nod hiilm i t nu \ \ DUIIHIM" VUIS HI asMiie 
\ wiareni account is an account where the account owner borrows a portion of 
the purchase price for certain securities. The loan in the margin account is collateralized 
by the stock, and if the \ aiue of the stock drops, the owner will be asked to either put in 
more cash or sell a portion ,«: v:c stock. A margin call is a demand upon a client to 
*b;n^r money or securities v lien the value of the securities purchased "on margin" falls. 
the return of her stock, as its sale would cause capital gains tax consequences. [R. 613-
614, Findings of Fact ffif 1-6, l l ] . 2 
There was never a margin call on Almon Milner Covey's account at Covey & Co. 
Despite this fact, the Sears stock was lost, without the knowledge or consent of Noel 
Milner Covey. In addition, on September 30, 1992, Noel Milner Covey's stock account 
at Covey & Co., over which her brother had exclusive control as her only stock broker, 
was converted to a margin account. Then, without the knowledge or consent of Noel 
Milner Covey, $100,000 was taken from her account, and placed into Almon Milner 
Covey's personal error account. Later, some, but not all, of the funds were transferred 
back into Noel Milner Covey's account. [R. 616-619, Findings of Fact ffi[ 19-31, 33-43]. 
Noel Milner Covey brought claims for specific performance for the return of the 
Sears stock and for the loss of funds from her stock account at Covey & Co. Noel Milner 
Covey prevailed on these claims at trial, and Almon Milner Covey now appeals the trial 
court's findings in support of that judgment. Noel Milner Covey also obtained judgment 
on her claims against Almon Milner Covey to recover for various loans he had not repaid, 
for an $11,500 promissory note, a $14,160 loan, a $41,000 promissory note, and a $1,000 
loan, none of which are challenged on appeal by Almon Milner Covey. [R. 619-622, 
Findings of Fact ffif 44-60]. 
2
 The Findings of Fact are attached as Addendum 2 to Appellant's Brief. 
APPELLEE'S RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT Ol ISSUES AND 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Appellee N"d Milin'i i ' " ' *• l ir iclv n^pnud in iL \ppr | l int"> Si itenicnl of 
Issues/Standard of Review (the "Statement of Issues"). 
First, AlmonMilner Covey's Statement of Issues is incomplete, ana ,u » .•>.<.! .>•. >•; 
'iliilcmrnl of the issue and standard of review , but aKr a citation to the record showing 
that the issue was preserved - • ial court; o? statement of grounds for seeking 
:
-w of an issue not preserved in the u .u> * oun. ; u*.. s\. \\:{ x 
. ; • .; - trie I make1- < •••' ! >Hlant's Brief at 2-3j. The 
Court may therefore pass on these issues. See West Valle> Ot\ v. Majestic Inv. Co.. *^ £ 
P.2d 1311, 1316 (Utah App. 1991) (appellate arguments must be • explain iu\.;, .he 
record | 
Second, the Statement of Issues applies, in part, the wrong standard of review: 
1 Almon Milner Covey's challenge to the trial court's denial of his 
request for a jury trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, 
and not for correctness 
Almon Milner Covey asserts that the trial court's denial of a jury trial is an issue 
of "statutory interpretation," and *h^ ^ . .\ ... u\ie\. :or corrects , > 
slatiiKn s uiliM'ptvialioii is a <|in *> * * ?i ! l ^ ever, the issue 
is not one of statutory interpretation, but rather is whether Almon Milner Covey waived 
his right to a jun I rial under the facts The nroper standard ot review is toi an ..\> , f 
discretion. See Aspenwooa, LJLI \, v .n. i , L..I .V _ * ••' ' 
Adv. Rep. 7 ("We review the trial court's finding that [a party] waived its right to a jury 
trial for an abuse of discretion."). Review for abuse of discretion presents a substantial 
hurdle. An appellate court will find that a trial court has abused its discretion "only if the 
trial court's decision was 'beyond the limits of reasonability/" State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 
332, 334 (Utah 1993) (quotation omitted). In addition, an abuse of discretion only occurs 
if the trial court's actions are "inherently unfair" or if the appellate court can "conclude 
that fno reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.™ State v. 
Russell 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990) and State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). 
2. Almon Milner Covey's challenge to the trial court's rejection of 
his accord and satisfaction defense is subject to review on 
whether the trial court's findings are "clearly erroneous," not 
the "correctness" standard 
Noel Milner Covey agrees that the Loan Accommodation Agreement may be 
reviewed, in the first instance, as a matter of law. [Appellants Brief at 2]. However, as 
explained below, Almon Milner Covey's argument is a thin attempt to have this Court 
second-guess the trial court's detailed findings of fact in support of the rejection of his 
accord and satisfaction, election of remedies, and estoppel defenses. Thus, the standard 
of review is substantially more deferential. "On appeal from a bench trial, 'findings of 
fact . . . shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses,/" Tanner v. 
Carter, 2001 UT 18, If 2, 20 P.3d 332 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)). "For a reviewing 
court to find clear error, it must decide that the factual findings made by the trial court 
are not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a 
•st favorable to the trial court's de tenmiu l ion "' Si ale v. I ena, Hi'V1! V 2i\ <> t,\ '"> \h 
if'iljtiib h)<U\ 
Almon Milner Co\ ej 5s challenge to the trial court's rejection, of 
his mitigation of damages argument is subject to review on 
whether the trial court's findings are "clearly erroneous," not 
the "correctness" standard 
Almon Milner Covey asserts that this issue is whether Noel Milner Covey would 
incurred a tax liability if she had purchased stock to repiu v^_ Midi iuiviii o\ i.er 
. ••»! TI '-- oy
 lb reali> chd i i en^n^ uie trial U J U I ; 6 rejection of ins argumeni that 
Noel Milner Covey failed to mitigate her damages 
Mitigation is necessarily a question 111 LiiA,, JIIHJ IIIS .IIMU suh|ivl I ilcterniliiil 
•>cc JL_UI "ena, 869 P.2d at 936: see also, Reid v. Mutual 
V,.
 v i iq Ins. Co., 77ft 1* ^ *•'*• l>u~M/ut lOSQnlu^lJinji ' .hat, in landlord-tenant case, 
objective commercial J U I M - ; n .f3l1 ^^ mitigation . n o n s is a fact queslic ill I U x l - _ 
6. Yhe proper standard of review for the challenge to the trial 
court's finding Almon Milner Covey breached his fiduciary duty 
by converting $100,000 in Noel Milner Covey's stock account is 
whether the trial court's findings are "clearly erroneous," not 
the"substantial evidence" standard 
Almon Mill KM "I ovey asserts this issue is whether the trial court properly pierced 
• the corporate veil, which calls for a "substantial evidence" standard of review. 
[Appellant's Brief at J* j Agdn • ^,-i.on Milner Covey misstau. *._:....:. 
('<inii.li i in Uni ill I lliiim/i (' in c\ \ -issnliiini ilur lliiiui! i mini nmnrrl\ ruled that Almon 
Milner Covey was liable to Noel Milner Covey because of a breach of his personal 
fiduciary duty, owed to her directly. [R. 618-619, Findings of Fact fflf 33-43]. Thus, the 
real challenge is to the trial court's findings of fact. Tanner, 2001 UT 18 at t 2; Pena, 
869P.2dat936. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(b)(1), Appellee Noel Milner Covey hereby 
responds to certain inaccurate or incomplete representations in the Statement of Facts 
submitted by Appellant Almon Milner Covey. 
A. Response to Almon Milner Covey's Statement of Facts Relating to the 
Loan Accommodation Agreement and the Disposition of the Proceeds 
from the Sale of the Walker Lane Property 
Response to Statements of Fact Nos. 1-4: Almon Milner Covey and Noel 
Milner Covey entered into the Loan Accommodation Agreement; nevertheless, the 
implication that the Notice of Interest in Real Property was the only collateral, or 
execution upon that property was the only remedy under the agreement, is incorrect. In 
fact, the Loan Accommodation Agreement explicitly provided that exercise of "any" of 
the several remedies available under the agreement would not "preclude any other or 
further exercise thereof or the exercise of any other right, power, or remedy under" the 
agreement, and that the remedies allowed by the Notice of Interest were "cumulative and 
not exclusive of any remedies provided by law." [R. 100022]; [R. 615-616, Findings of 
Fact 1ft 15, 18]. 
Furthermore, even if the "in lieu of language of the Loan Accommodation 
Agreement was intended to be an exclusive remedy, that remedy could only become 
exclusive under the particular and limited circumstance that Noel Milner Covey's stock 
was lost due to a margin call on Alnion Milner Cove)' s uccouiu. w Inch mi \ vt luppuinl . 
\V IINNI "MiiUli | |l! ill 1 <ih hnt)iih»;> if Tact f\\ I I, I '| 
Response to Statements of Fact Nos. 5-10: It is true that the Walker Lane 
property was sold, and that Noel Milner Covey took possession of the proceeds from that 
sale, |Appellaitfs Hnefiil I | • I IIIMI MilnrH ii\i\ inisstales lln ivun/l however,. 
vviien fii1 asserts and implies that Noel Milner Covey's retention of these proceeds was 
\ a resolution of the dispute, and the citation in Almon Milner ( u\ c> "s Statement 
A f V \ . . ii... . . . v i ^ , this sum. lo n »u'i llu h»v il ihv ' : s 
., ivocally and soundl% r^eetedby the trier of fact. [R. 
617, 622-625, Findings of Fact ffl| 29-30, 62-75]. 
B Facts Relating to Mr. Keller's Representation (and Lack of 
Representation) of Almon Milner Covey, Almon Milner Covey's 
Failure to Appeal for the PreTrial Conference, the Trial Court's Entry 
of Default Against Almon Milner Covey, and Noel Milner Covey's 
Withdrawal of Her Request for a Jury Trial After the Default 
Almon Milner Covey's Statement > ul 1 ad Nos, I " Ifiia'iU mnL, (in iik'ninpldc 
liiiul «i( least ptittii.ilh m<L,nir!»h,l p idureof the events that led to (i) the trial court's entry 
d xw'r- judgment against Almon Milner Covey; (ii) Noel Milner Covey's subsequent 
withdrawal ul ii^t jui > cuaiui-%; in I hi1 trial court '* IJU i v illulu11 .ill nil llir dd mil mud 
then Iiii I 111!" liiii.iiiil i mi in mi I'1, in mi. mi I in mi mi1 Iliiiit AII in in HI Milner Covey had waived and otherwise lost 
his right to a jury trial A complete recitation of the actual events, numbered for ease of 
reference, follows: 
1. On May 3, 2000, the trial court issued a Scheduling Order and Jury Trial 
Notice, setting a pre-trial conference for August 23, 2000, and trial for September 5, 
2000, and advising Almon Milner Covey, among other things, of the following: 
3. This case is set for a jury trial. Counsel are to submit an 
agreed set of jury instructions to the Court at the time of the pretrial 
conference. Objected to instructions and proposed voir dire questions 
along with a "courtesy copy" are to be submitted separately at the pretrial 
conference. . . . 
5. Failure to appear at the pretrial settlement conference 
may result in default. 
[R. 347-348]; [Addendum A] (underline emphasis added; bold emphasis in original). 
2. On June 19, 2000, Almon Milner Covey's attorney John Anderson 
withdrew (for the second time) as counsel of record for Almon Milner Covey. [R. 349-
350]. 
3. On July 6, 2000, Noel Milner Covey filed a Notice to Obtain New Counsel, 
in which she advised Almon Milner Covey of the upcoming Pretrial Conference, set for 
August 23, 2000, and the trial, set for September 5, 2000. [R. 352-353]. 
4. The first trial setting was then stricken, due to Mr. Anderson's withdrawal. 
[R. 358-359]. The trial court then scheduled an "IN COURT CONFERENCE" for 
October 18, 2000. [R. 358-359]. 
5. On October 18, 2000, Almon Milner Covey appeared pro se and 
represented that he would retain counsel prior to trial. Yet another Pretrial Conference 
was set for January 3,2001, and a four day jury trial was scheduled to commence on 
January 16,2001. [R. 377-378]. 
6. On October 23, 2000, the trial court issued yet another Scheduling Order 
and Jury Trial Notice, setting a pre-trial conference for January 3, 2000 at 8:30 a.m., with 
the trial commencing on January 16, 2000, and again advising Almon Milner Covey, 
among other things, of the following: 
3. This case is set for a jury trial. Counsel are to submit an 
agreed set of jury instructions to the Court at the time of the pretrial 
conference. Objected to instructions and proposed voir dire questions 
along with a "courtesy copy" are to be submitted separately at the pretrial 
conference. . .. 
5. Failure to appear at the pretrial settlement conference 
may result in default. 
[R. 379-380]; [Addendum B] (underline emphasis added; bold emphasis in original). 
7. On November 17, 2000, attorney Larry R. Keller filed a Motion for 
Continuance of Jury Trial, in which he represented to the trial court that Almon Milner 
Covey was appearing "through his attorney, Larry R. Keller," and that "defense counsel, 
Larry R. Keller, has just now been retained as counsel for Defendant " [R. 413-415] 
(emphasis added). 
8. Despite the unrestricted appearance by Mr. Keller as Almon Milner 
Covey's attorney, on December 5, 2000, Mr. Keller filed a Withdrawal of Counsel, but 
only after the trial court denied the Motion for Continuance of Jury Trial. [R. 425-427]. 
Mr. Keller retreated from his prior, unrestricted entry of appearance, and expressly noted 
that his participation was only a "possibility," and that he would not represent Almon 
Milner Covey until arrangements had been "worked out:" 
The undersigned counsel would like the Court and all parties to 
know that a possibility still exists that the undersigned counsel will enter a 
general Appearance of Counsel and represent the above-named Defendant 
at trial of this matter; nevertheless, arrangements for the same have not 
been worked out. 
[R. 426-427]; [Addendum C] (emphasis added). 
9. On January 3, 2001, at the time for the pre-trial conference that had been 
scheduled months before, in October 2000, Almon Milner Covey was not present. 
Although Mr. Keller and attorney Dena C. Sarandos were present, Mr. Keller steadfastly 
maintained the position taken in the December 5, 2000 Withdrawal of Counsel, indicating 
to the trial court that he did not represent Almon Milner Covey. [R. 443]; [R. 1023, Tr. 
15-16, 19]. 
10. At the pre-trial conference, the trial court therefore entered a default 
judgment against Almon Milner Covey, because of his failure to appear at the PreTrial 
Conference. In addition, the trial court found that Almon Milner Covey had not filed any 
proposed jury instructions, as required and ordered by the trial court in its October 23, 
2000 Scheduling Order. [R. 1023, Tr. 15-16]. 
11. In fact, on the day of trial, Almon Milner Covey's attorney argued with the 
trial court, asserting that the trial court had not, in fact, defaulted Almon Milner Covey at 
the January 3, 2001 pre-trial conference. [R. 1023, Tr. 17]. The trial court rejected this 
assertion and again confirmed on the record that Almon Milner Covey had been defaulted 
for failure to appear at the pre-trial conference. [R. 1023, Tr. 17]. The trial court 
repeatedly acknowledged the default entered against Almon Milner Covey, noting 
moments later that Almon Milner Covey "was defaulted at the pre-trial conference for his 
non-appearance " [R. 1023, Tr. 18]. The trial court also noted that Almon Milner 
Covey did not appear until "some 45 minutes or so after the starting time" for the pre-trial 
conference. [R. 1023, Tr. 19]. 
12. During the pre-trial conference, but after the trial court had entered Almon 
Milner Covey's default, Noel Milner Covey withdrew her request for a jury trial, and the 
trial court converted the case to a bench trial. [R. 1023, Tr. 10-11]; [R. 443]. Later that 
day, at 2:30 p.m., long after the conclusion of the 8:30 a.m. pre-trial conference, Mr. 
Keller finally entered an appearance for Almon Milner Covey. The trial court issued a 
notice, clearly stating, not just once, but twice, that the trial would be to the bench. [R. 
443-444]. The trial court later withdrew the default, but held that Almon Milner Covey 
had waived his right to a jury trial. [R. 347-348; 379-380; 441-443]; [R. 1023, Tr. 10-11, 
14-16,22-25]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS3 
Jury Trial: Almon Milner Covey cannot challenge the trial court's grant of 
specific performance. That remedy is equitable and is not triable to a jury. Furthermore, 
a jury trial was properly denied because, among other things, Almon Milner Covey was 
defaulted for failure to appear at the pre-trial conference, after which Noel Milner Covey 
properly withdrew her jury demand. Thus, the Rule 38 prohibition against a unilateral 
withdrawal of a jury demand is inapplicable. Finally, Almon Milner Covey waived his 
3
 Almon Milner Covey again violates the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this 
time by failing to include a Summary of Arguments section in his brief. See Utah R. App. 
P. 24(a)(8). This is not the first time that Appellant has failed to follow the rules of 
Appellate procedure. See Appellee Noel Milner Covey's Motion for Summary 
Disposition, filed with the Utah Supreme Court on March 11, 2002. 
right to a jury trial by failing to object to the trial court's clear notice that the case would 
be to the bench, and by violating the trial court's order that he submit jury instructions. 
Loan Accommodation Agreement and Accord and Satisfaction: Almon 
Milner Covey's challenge purports to be one of law, but is really a challenge to the trial 
court's Findings of Fact in support of the rejection of his accord and satisfaction 
argument. The trial court correctly found that the "in lieu of language of the Loan 
Accommodation Agreement was not triggered, as this language only applied if the stock 
was lost through a margin call on Almon Milner Covey's account - which never 
happened. Furthermore, even if Almon Milner Covey's argument were correct, the Loan 
Accommodation Agreement expressly preserved Noel Milner Covey's right to seek any 
and all other remedies. Finally, the trial court properly found, based on substantial 
evidence, that there was no accord and satisfaction, election of remedies, or estoppel. 
Tax Consequences: Almon Milner Covey again misconstrues the standard of 
review, in an attempt to collaterally attack the trial court's rejection of his mitigation of 
damages defense. He fails to marshal the evidence. He ignores the trial court's reasons 
besides the tax consequences for rejecting his mitigation of damages defense. Finally, he 
ignores the evidence, including his own testimony, supporting the trial court's findings on 
the adverse tax consequences facing Noel Milner Covey if she had purchased 
replacement stock in her own name. 
Accord and Satifaction: Almon Milner Covey again tries to collaterally attack 
the trial court's rejection of his accord and satisfaction defense, by arguing that the trial 
court's findings of fact are inconsistent. They are not, and there is no legal significance 
to this point even if they were. Almon Milner Covey again fails to marshal the evidence, 
and there was substantial evidence supporting the trial court's rejection of the defense. 
Specific Performance: Almon Milner Covey challenges the trial court's order of 
specific performance, although he casts the argument as one of damages, invoking 
securities fraud cases. He fails to marshal the evidence. The argument was not raised 
before the trial court, and therefore cannot be considered on appeal. Finally, the securies 
fraud cases are inapplicable to the facts of this case, and do not support rejection of the 
trial court's careful analysis on the specific performance issue. 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Almon Milner Covey's final argument is that the trial 
court should have applied a piercing the corporate veil theory, rather than the direct claim 
for breach of fiduciary duty. This is simply wrong. The claim was a direct one for 
breach of fiduciary duty. There was substantial evidence supporting the finding that 
Almon Milner Covey was personally liable for the loss of approximately $55,000 from 
Noel Milner Covey's account, which was under his personal - and exclusive - control. 
Attorney Fees: Noel Milner Covey is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT ALMON COVEY 
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A JURY TRIAL 
A. Almon Milner Covey's Appeal of the Jury Demand Issue is Irrelevant 
- The Court's Order of Specific Performance Was An Equitable 
Remedy for Which Almon Milner Covey Had No Right to a Jury Trial 
Almon Milner Covey's appeal on the jury issue may be summarily rejected 
because he did not have the right to a jury trial on Noel Milner Covey's claim for specific 
performance, which is an equitable remedy: 
"Specific performance is a remedy of equity which is addressed to the sense 
of justice and good conscience of the court, and accordingly, considerable 
latitude of discretion is allowed in [the trial court's] determination as to 
whether it shall be granted and what judgment should be entered . . . ." 
Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981); see also LHIW, Inc. v. 
DeLorean, 753 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988). Specific performance as a 
remedy will stand and will not be upset on appeal in the absence of an 
abuse of discretion. Morris, 624 P.2d at 684. 
Spears v. Warr. 2002 UT 24, ^  42, 44 P.3d 742 (emphasis added). 
There is no right to a jury trial on an equitable remedy. See, e ^ , Peirce v. Peirce, 
2000 UT 7, f 12, 994 P.2d 193 ("The determination of whether a jury was merely 
advisory or acting as of right depends in part upon whether the plaintiff seeks a remedy at 
law or in equity . . . Thus, where an equitable remedy is sought, the trial court decides the 
issues and the jury's role is limited to aiding the court in its decision.") (citations and 
quotations omitted). 
Therefore, even if Almon Milner Covey was entitled to a jury trial on some of the 
issues in the case, he is not entitled to a reversal of the trial court's ruling on specific 
performance, and that portion of the judgment should be summarily affirmed. 
B. The District Court Properly Entered a Default Judgment Against 
Almon Milner Covey for His Failure to Appear at the Pre-Trial 
Conference and His Other Violations of the Trial Court's Orders. 
It is undisputed that Almon Milner Covey missed the pre-trial conference. 
Although Larry R. Keller was present as only a self-styled "friend of the court/' he 
specifically and carefully refrained from entering an appearance for Almon Milner 
Covey. Thus, the trial court defaulted Almon Milner Covey for failure to appear. [R. 
443]; [R. 1023, Tr. 10-11,14-19]. 
Even Appellant's attorney, Larry R. Keller, admitted in open court on the day of 
trial that Noel Milner Covey withdrew her request for a jury trial before Mr. Keller 
entered an appearance for Almon Milner Covey (which was not until later that day, hours 
after the pre-trial conference had ended): 
THE COURT: And the plaintiff then withdrew [the jury 
demand] at the pre-trial conference where you [Larry R. Keller] were also 
present but not yet had entered your appearance. 
MR. KELLER: That's correct sir. 
[R. 1023, Tr. 10] (emphasis added). Mr. Keller also admitted in open court that the "pre-
trial conference was finished" before Almon Milner Covey appeared. [R. 1023, Tr. 11]. 
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 16, the trial court had a wide number of 
discretionary sanctions available, including entry of a default judgment, for Almon 
Milner Covey's violation of the trial court's order and failure to appear at the pre-trial 
conference: 
(d) Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or 
pretrial order, if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling 
or pretrial conference,... the court, upon motion or its own initiative, may 
make such orders with regard thereto as are just, and among others, any of 
the orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D) . . . . [4] 
Utah R. Civ. P. 16(d); see Arnold v. Curtis. 846 P.2d 1307, 1309-1310 (Utah 1993) (trial 
court properly entered summary judgment where party failed to designate witnesses 
pursuant to scheduling order); Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, fflf 32-33, 17 P.3d 
1110 (Utah 2000) (affirming exclusion of all plaintiffs exhibits at trial, based in part 
upon failure to comply with pretrial order requiring exchange of exhibit list). The trial 
court also had the authority to strike Almon Milner Covey's jury demand. 
In light of Almon Milner Covey's failure to appear at the pre-trial conference until 
after it had been completed, the trial court was well within its discretion in entering a 
default judgment against Almon Milner Covey. The trial court could have also stricken 
pleadings or defenses, or imposed other sanctions, as it felt appropriate. Thus, as 
explained infra, Almon Milner Covey was defaulted, after which Noel Milner Covey was 
entitled to unilaterally withdraw her jury request. Once default had been entered against 
Almon Milner Covey, and Noel Milner Covey had withdrawn her jury request, there was 
no basis for proceeding with a jury trial. Although the trial court set aside the default 
judgment, it had no obligation to set aside its finding that Almon Milner Covey had 
waived his right to a jury trial. 
4
 Rule 37(b)(2) allows "an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof,... or 
rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party." U. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) 
(emphasis added); see also Mohamad v. Simmons, 534 S.E.2d 616, 620 (N. Carolina 
App. 2000) (trial court did not deprive party of constitutional right to jury trial by 
enforcing Rule 37 sanctions); Ward v. Hester, 288 N.E.2d 840,127-128 (Ohio App. 1972) 
(same). 
C. Under Utah Law, Plaintiff Noel Milner Covey Was Entitled to 
Unilaterally Withdraw Her Jury Demand After Defendant Almon 
Milner Covey Had Been Defaulted 
The Utah Supreme Court has already considered - and rejected - the identical 
argument made by Almon Milner Covey in this case, under directly analogous facts. In 
Arnica Mutual Insurance Company v. Carl F. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950 (Utah 1989), the 
trial court entered a default judgment against the defendant pursuant to Rule 37, for 
failure to comply with a discovery order. Id at 955. Thereafter, as in this case, the 
plaintiff unilaterally withdrew its jury demand, and proceeded to trial on the issue of 
damages to the bench. IcL The defendant in the Schettler case argued, like Almon Milner 
Covey in this case, that Rule 38 prohibited withdrawal of the jury demand without the 
consent of both parties. Also like Almon Milner Covey, the defendant in Schettler filed a 
separate jury demand, after the plaintiffs withdrawal of the jury demand. Id at 955, 963. 
The Utah Supreme Court soundly rejected all of the same arguments now made by 
Almon Milner Covey, applying reasoning directly analogous to this case: 
Alternatively, [defendant] claims that even if in the first instance he 
did not have a right to a jury trial, under Utah R. Civ. P. 38, the trial court 
nonetheless improperly allowed [plaintiff] to unilaterally withdraw its jury 
demand following entry of his default. We disagree. 
In its complaint, [plaintiff] requested a jury trial and subsequently 
withdrew its request following the entry of [defendant's] default. 
Thereafter, [defendant] requested a jury trial. Rule 38(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure provides that any party may demand a trial by jury and 
subsection (d) provides that once made, a demand for a jury trial may not 
be withdrawn without the consent of the parties. 
Rule 38(d) of both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure require the consent of both parties before a jury 
request may be withdrawn However, the consent requirement of Utah R. 
Civ. P. 38(d) does not apply once default has been entered. 
Id. at 963 (emphasis added). 
Here, as in Schettler, the jury demand was not withdrawn until after a default 
judgment had been entered against the defendant. Later, after Larry R. Keller entered his 
appearance, the default was withdrawn. [R. 1023, Tr.17]. Thus, the Rule 38(d) 
prohibition against a unilateral withdrawal of a jury demand is inapplicable, and the trial 
court correctly denied Almon Milner Covey's untimely demand for a juiy trial. 
D. The Trial Court Properly Found that Almon Milner Covey Waived 
Any Right to a Jury Trial 
1. Almon Covey Waived His Right to a Jury Trial By Violation of 
the Order to Prepare and Exchange Jury Instructions 
As one court has noted, the "Second Circuit pronouncement on this issue and 
cases from other circuits support the proposition that a demand for a jury trial can be 
waived by the conduct of the parties in a variety of ways." Kahn v. GM Corp., 865 
F.Supp. 210, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). And, although "[a] jury trial is an important 
constitutional right,... like other constitutional rights it can be waived." Aspenwood, 
2003 UT App. 28, H 38. 
Here, even if the trial court had not defaulted Almon Milner Covey before Noel 
Milner Covey's withdrawal of her jury request, the trial court properly found that Almon 
Milner Covey waived his right to a jury by failing to comply with the trial court's 
repeated orders to prepare and exchange jury instructions: 
3. This case is set for a jury trial. Counsel are to submit an 
agreed set of jury instructions to the Court at the time of the pretrial 
conference. Objected to instructions and proposed voir dire questions 
along with a "courtesy copy" are to be submitted separately at the pretrial 
conference. . . 
[R. 379-380]; [Add. B] (underline emphasis added). This was the second such order that 
had been issued. Despite this clear mandate, Almon Milner Covey did not prepare jury 
instructions, he did not submit jury instructions to opposing counsel, and finally, even 
after he filed his separate demand for a jury trial, he did not submit jury instructions to 
the trial court.5 [R. 347-348; 379-380]; [R. 1023, Tr. 14-16,22-24]. 
The court therefore found that Almon Milner Covey had impeded the ability of the 
court to conduct a jury trial, and therefore waived his right to a jury trial: 
. . . The plaintiff did not file their jury instructions and the defendant was 
not prepared at the pre-trial conference to proceed with alternative jury 
instructions nor with a proper demand. That demand was made several 
days thereafter, as I recall it, whatever the timing, the timing is not an issue. 
You did file a jury demand and that was before this trial was to begin; but 
with that, there were no accompanying jury instructions nor any other 
evidence that there was the ability to proceed with the trial and there was no 
serving on the plaintiff of appropriate jury instructions so the plaintiff could 
so be prepared for the jury trial. 
5
 Almon Milner Covey may argue in reply that he did not submit jury instructions 
after filing his jury demand because the trial court had already ruled that he had waived 
his right to a jury trial. This argument supports the prior discussion, that Almon Milner 
Covey was defaulted and/or had waived his right to a jury trial before he filed his 
separate jury trial demand, making his demand was untimely. 
In addition, any argument that Almon Milner Covey could have filed jury 
instructions, but did not do so because of the trial court's order, is disingenuous. If 
Almon Milner Covey really intended to proceed with a jury trial, he could and should 
have prepared jury instructions, and submitted them to opposing counsel, as required by 
the pre-trial order. He also could and should have objected to the trial court's clear 
written notice of the bench trial. As explained in the next section, his failure to do these 
things is fatal. 
[R. 1023, Tr. 16] (emphasis added). The trial court went on to further explain: 
. . . I also state for the record that the defendant was not prepared to proceed 
with a jury trial at the time of the pre-trial conference with the appropriate 
preparations and the defendant did not appear timely or by counsel, 'cause 
you [Larry Keller] weren't in—in the matter,... 
THE COURT: So, I—I do acknowledge that you did file a -a 
jury demand and you did not accompany that with any jury instructions or 
any other preparations that would be consistent of pre-trial. I'm not going 
to fault you for that because I think you could well have gotten those 
together shortly thereafter; [6] but there - there never has been presented to 
me a set of pre-approved jury instructions by both sides or even a — a set of 
jury instructions other than - well, there hasn't been presented them. So 
plaintiff had hers at the pre-trial and didn't present them, so I've never had 
any jury instructions that could have been used for trying the case. But 
that's - that could or - or potentially would have been something that could 
have been done between the 4th and the 16th. 
[R. 1023, Tr. 24-25] (emphasis added). 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed a trial court's denial of a request 
for a jury trial where, like the instant case, the objecting "parties failed to respect its pre-
trial order that they furnish the court with a 'clean' set of proposed jury instructions and a 
form of special verdict one week prior to trial." Grant v. City of Los Angeles, 19 F.3d 27 
(Table), 1994 WL 46313 **1 (9th Cir. 1994) [Courtesy copy attached as Addendum "D"]. 
6
 Appellee's Brief takes this statement out of context, using it to suggest that 
Almon Milner Covey's failure to file jury instructions was not a reason for the trial 
court's denial of his request for a jury trial. [Appellant's Brief at 6-7, Statement of Facts 
If 14]. When read in context, it is clear that the trial court's statement indicated that 
Appellant's attorney was not expected to have jury instructions at the pre-trial conference 
because he had not yet entered his appearance, but that if Almon Milner Covey wanted a 
jury trial he should have submitted his jury instructions "between the 4th and the 16th" of 
January 2001, before the day of trial. [R. 1023, Tr. 24-25]. As noted, Almon Milner 
Covey did neither. 
In affirming the lower court, the Ninth Circuit endorsed the discretion accorded to the 
trial court in managing its docket, using rationale directly analogous to this case: 
We find no abuse here. First, because the court provided all parties 
with adequate notice that noncompliance with its order would be deemed a 
waiver of jury trial, we are not faced with the circumstances present in 
Pradier v. Elespuru, 641 F.2d 808, 811 (9th Or. 1981) ("The local rule does 
not say that the failure to [comply] ... invalidates the demand.") or Lawson 
v. Kolender, 658 F.2d 1362, 1372 (9th Or. 1981) ("Lawson's right to a jury 
trial should not have been denied where he had no warning of this severe 
sanction."). Second, the court in this case furnished a reasonable 
explanation for requiring the instructions and special verdict form one week 
before trial stating that it needed to examine the submissions in advance so 
that there would be no delay in starting the trial. It noted that the failure of 
the parties to adhere to this deadline seriously hampered its efforts to 
administer justice. 
Id at **2 (emphasis added). On this rationale, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court. 
Id. The sentiment that a trial court's ability to conduct its business, and that a party 
requesting a jury trial must assist the judicial process, was echoed by the Kahn court, 
which noted that "[c]oncern for judicial economy must play an important role in the 
determination of whether a [party] effectively waived the jury demand under Rule 39(a)." 
865 F.Supp. at 214. Other courts are in accord.7 
7
 See, e^ , Schoolev v. Kennedy. 712 F.2d 372, 373-374 (8th Cir. 1983) 
(affirming dismissal of plaintiffs' case where plaintiffs violated pre-trial order requiring 
filing of jury instructions by filing only a single jury instruction, with no citation to 
authority, and no trial brief); General Casualty Co. of Wise, v. Gilbert, 558 N.W.2d 704, 
1996 WL 665465 (Wise. App. 1996) (affirming trial court's refusal to allow issue to go 
to jury, where, in part, defendant "never specifically asked the court to submit the issue to 
the jury, and never requested any jury instructions or verdict questions on this issue."); cf 
Service Master of St. Cloud v. GAB Business Services. Inc.. 530 N.W.2d 558, 563 
(Minnesota App. 1995) (affirming trial court's finding that party waived right to jury 
trial, in part because party's "proposed jury instructions and special verdict form omitted 
any reference to those claims."). 
Under Rule 16, the trial court has discretion in considering the appropriate 
sanction for violation of its pre-trial order. See, e^ , Hall v. NAMC Intermountain, Inc., 
1999 UT 97, K 27, 988 P.2d 942 ("Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 16 grants the trial court 
the discretion to impose sanctions where necessary to assure the timely and orderly 
disposition of the case."); see also, Arnold, 846 P.2d at 1310 (same); Gorostieta, 2000 UT 
99 at ff 32-33 (same). In this case, the sanction was particularly and carefully tailored to 
the violation of the trial court's order - the refusal to provide jury instructions was met 
with a refusal to allow defendant to make an untimely demand for a jury trial, after Noel 
o 
Milner Covey properly withdrew her request for a jury. See In re 1208, Inc., 3 
F.R.Serv.2d 16.43, case 1 (D.C.Pa. 1960) (denying jury demand, as sanction for party's 
failure to appear at pretrial conference). The trial court's finding of waiver should be 
confirmed. 
2. Almon Milner Covey Waived His Right to a Jury Trial By 
Failing to Object to the Trial Court's Unequivocal Minute Entry 
That the Trial Would Be To the Bench, and Not a Jury 
Failure to object to a scheduled bench trial until the eve of trial is independent 
grounds for finding a waiver of the right to a jury trial. Directly analogous facts were 
recently considered by this Court in the Aspenwood case. There, the plaintiff had 
8
 Almon Milner Covey tries to argue that his filing of a separate jury demand, after 
Ms. Covey had withdrawn her demand, was sufficient to constitute a jury demand under 
the rules. This argument fails, as Almon Milner Covey's jury demand, filed after he 
waived his right to a jury trial by his conduct, and years after he was required to do so 
under Rule 38(b), was untimely. See General Business Services, Inc. v. Fletcher, 435 
F.2d 863, 864 (4th Cir. 1970) ("... once waived the subsequent demand was not 
timely."). 
originally requested a jury trial. IdL 2003 UT App. 28, f 34. Subsequently, the trial court 
issued two minute entries stating that the trial would be to the bench. Id. Approximately 
one month before trial, the plaintiff demanded a jury trial (by including the demand in an 
amended complaint). IdL The trial court held that the plaintiff had waived its right to a 
jury trial because it did not object to the minute entries, which clearly indicated that trial 
would be to the bench. Id at 1ffl 34-35. 
The plaintiff appealed, making arguments virtually identical to those advanced by 
Almon Milner Covey in this case. IdL at fflf 33, 35-37. This Court rejected those 
arguments: 
Although Utah has not directly addressed waiver of a jury trial under 
similar circumstances, the issue has been addressed by some federal courts. 
In Sewell v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 863 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1988), 
the appellant properly requested a jury trial on the complaint in accordance 
with rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. at 463. 
However, during the final pretrial conference, the appellant requested a 
continuance of the jury trial date. See id. Appellant's motion was granted, 
but the court stated in its order that the case was continued until a later date 
"for a trial before the court." Id. The appellant made no objection to the 
court's order until the commencement of the trial. See id. On the day of 
trial, the appellant requested the court to summon a jury. See id. The court 
examined the order, which noted that the trial was to be tried before the 
court. See id. After a discussion with counsel, the court concluded that the 
appellant had waived the right to a jury trial by failing to timely object to 
the court's pre-trial order removing the case from the jury trial docket. See 
id. 
The appellant appealed arguing that her fundamental constitutional 
right to a jury trial by jury had been denied. See id. at 464. The appellate 
court addressed whether the appellant had waived her right to a jury by 
reviewing rule 39(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. The 
court noted that the "requirements of Rule 39(a) have 'been interpreted 
broadly so as to encompass orders entered by the court and not objected 
to.'" Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, because the appellant failed to 
object to the court's written order for a bench trial, the order "constituted a 
'sufficient entry in the record to satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 
39(a)."5 Id. at 465 (citation omitted). The court also stated that the 
appellant's failure to object to the "order for almost four months provided 
additional support for the district court's conclusion that there had been a 
waiver of the jury trial." Id. 
Other federal courts have similarly held that a jury trial can be 
waived under rule 39. . . . 
We find the analysis of these federal cases under rule 39 persuasive. 
Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that [plaintiff] waived its right to a jury trial because, after 
having notice that the trial was set before the bench, [plaintiff] failed to 
object until the eve of trial. 
Li at Iflj 38-41 (emphasis added). 
Appellant, like the plaintiff in the Aspenwood case, was given written notice that 
stated not just once, but twice, that the trial would be to the bench, and not to a jury: 
. . . Mr. Keller and Ms. Sarandos appear as friend of the Court; they have 
not entered appearance for defendant yet. Jury trial is waived by the 
plaintiff- trial will be to the Court. . . . Counsel are to notify the Court by 
this Friday re starting time of trial and amount of time required for bench 
trial. 
[R. 443] (emphasis added). In the face of this notice, Appellant did not file a motion 
challenging the trial court's ruling at the pre-trial conference. Appellant did not file a 
motion requesting a hearing on the issue. Appellant did not prepare or exchange jury 
instructions. Appellant did not appear on the day of trial with prepared jury instructions. 
Indeed, Appellant did nothing in response to the notice. Then, on the very morning of 
trial, Almon Milner Covey challeneged - for the first time - the trial court's order that 
the case would proceed to the bench.9 
Thus, for the same reasons as set forth in the Aspenwood case, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's finding that Almon Milner Covey waived his right to a jury trial.10 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT ALMON MILNER 
COVEY FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN TO SHOW AN ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION, AN ELECTION OF REMEDIES, OR ESTOPPEL 
Appellant's next argument purports to be one of law, asserting that the trial court 
misinterpreted the Loan Accommodation Agreement when it held that the Agreement 
"anticipated only one circumstance in which the Sears Stock could be sold, namely, if 
Covey & Co. executed on the Sears Stock to satisfy margin requirements in Almon 
Milner Covey's personal margin account at Covey & Co." [Appellant's Brief at 14; R. 
9
 Almon Milner Covey's request for a jury trial on the very morning of trial, after 
having failed to submit jury instructions, and without any objection to the trial court's 
clear notice weeks before that the trial would be to the bench, was a transparent, last-
ditch effort to delay the trial, or create an issue for appeal. 
10
 Appellant asserts that this Court must conclude that the trial court erred because 
it could only have denied Almon Milner Covey a jury trial upon "a written or oral 
stipulation consenting to trial without a jury." [Appellant's Brief at 11]. 
However, in the Aspenwood case, there was never any contention that the plaintiff 
voluntarily withdrew its request for a jury trial. Thus, the formalistic interpretation of 
Rule 39 urged by Almon Milner Covey, that there can never be a loss of a jury trial 
unless there is a "written or oral stipulation" has already been rejected by this Court. 
Indeed, this approach would place form over function, and allow a party to avoid a bench 
trial in all circumstances, simply by refusing to agree. Such a result is contrary to the 
cited authority, common sense, and the mandate of Rule 1 that the rules "shall be 
liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action." UtahR. Civ. P. 1(a). 
627, Concl. of Law ^  4]. Appellant concludes that because of this interpretation, the trial 
court erroneously rejected Almon Milner Covey's accord and satisfaction argument, 
which was that Noel Milner Covey should be precluded from any remedy just because 
she took custodial possession of the funds from the sale of the Walker Lane property. 
[Appellant's Brief at 14-17]. This argument fails in at least three critical respects. 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Interpreted the Loan Accommodation 
Agreement 
Almon Milner Covey's argument appears to be that the trial court should have 
read the "in lieu of language of the Loan Accommodation Agreement, and determined 
as a matter of law that the custodial receipt by Noel Milner Covey of the proceeds from 
the Walker Lane sale constituted her only and sole remedy in this case. [Appellant's 
Brief at 14-15]. 
Almon Milner Covey's interpretation of the "in lieu of language as an exclusive 
remedy is incorrect, as explained in the next section. However, even if this interpretation 
is correct, it flies in the face of the plain language of the Loan Accommodation 
Agreement, which contemplated only one circumstance by which the "in lieu of 
language would become effective: 
1. Loan of Securities. Concurrently with the execution of this 
Agreement, Lender is delivering to Borrower the stock certificates 
representing the Securities listed on Exhibit "A." . . . Lender authorizes 
Borrower to deliver these Securities to the brokerage firm as collateral on 
such margin account, provided that Borrower enters into an appropriate 
pledge agreement with the brokerage firm under the terms of which 
ownership shall not be transferred unless and until the brokerage firm 
executes on the collateral to cover the required margin in accordance with 
the terms of the pledge agreement and the requirements under Borrower's 
margin account. In such event. Lender shall have all of the remedies set 
forth in this Agreement. 
[R. 100021] (emphasis added). 
Under this plain language, the trial court properly found that the Loan 
Accommodation Agreement did not preclude Noel Milner Covey from any particular 
remedy, as the "in lieu o f language was not triggered by the loss of the stock through a 
margin call on Almon Milner Covey's account. [R. 614, 616, Findings of Fact IflJ 11, 20-
21]; [R. 1023, Tr. 159,230-231]. 
B. Even if the Court Accepts Almon Milner Covey's Interpretation of the 
Loan Accommodation Agreement, the Plain Language of the Loan 
Accommodation Agreement Does Not Restrict Noel Milner Covey to 
Only the Remedy of Pursuing the Walker Lane Property 
Even if this Court determines that the Loan Accommodation Agreement 
contemplated the loss of Noel Milner Covey's stock through means other than a margin 
call on Almon Milner Covey's account, the plain language of the Loan Accommodation 
Agreement does not - as Almon Milner Covey argues - restrict Noel Milner Covey's 
remedy for the loss of her stock to only a remedy against the Walker Lane property. 
First, the Loan Accommodation Agreement provided for several remedies, 
including execution against a Ferrari11 owned by Almon Milner Covey, and a penalty of 
$1,000 per day for every day the stock was not returned. [R. 100021-100022]. In fact, 
11
 Even though Noel Milner Covey had been given the title to her brother's 1988 
black Ferrari as security against the stock loan, he later sold that automobile without Noel 
Milner Covey's notice or consent. [R. 1023, Tr. 71-72]. 
the Loan Accommodation Agreement refers to multiple "remedies," "in the event that 
Borrower does not return the Securities timely." [R. 100021]. 
Furthermore, the Loan Accommodation Agreement unambiguously provides that 
Noel Milner Covey's remedies are cumulative, and that exercise of any particular right 
under the Loan Accommodation Agreement is not a waiver of any other available rights 
or remedies: 
(c) No failure or delay on the part of Lender in exercising any 
right, power, or remedy under this Agreement or any exhibits or other 
documents executed and delivered in connection herewith shall operate as 
a waiver thereof; [n]or shall any single or partial exercise of any such 
right, power, or remedy under this Agreement, the exhibits hereto, or any 
other document executed and delivered in connection herewith. The 
remedies provided in such documents are cumulative and not exclusive of 
any remedies provided by law. 
[R. 100022] (emphasis added). The trial court's findings were consistent with this 
language. [R. 615-616, Findings of Fact ^  14-15, 18]. Such a reservation of rights and 
remedies is valid and enforceable. See, e,g., ESPN, Inc. v. Commissioner of Baseball, 76 
F.Supp.2d 383, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Dewerd v. Bushfield, 993 F.Supp. 365, 368 (V.I. 
1998). 
i *y 
Thus, the agreement unambiguously indicates that Noel Milner Covey's 
remedies under the Loan Accommodation Agreement were not, as Appellant argues, 
Both parties agree the contract is unambiguous - yet they reach different 
conclusions as to its meaning. The best Almon Milner Covey can do, therefore, is 
convince this Court that because of his disagreement as to the plain meaning of the 
agreement, the Court should find the contract ambiguous. If the Court so finds, then 
extrinsic evidence as to the parties' intent may be considered. Plateau Mining Co. v. 
Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). 
(continued...) 
limited solely to the Walker Lane property. As a matter of law, Noel Milner Covey was 
entitled under the Loan Accommodation Agreement to pursue any and all claims against 
Almon Milner Covey, including the claim for specific performance for the return of the 
Sears stock, regardless of whether Noel Milner Covey chose to seek any relief from the 
Walker Lane property. 
C. Almon Milner Covey Does Not Challenge the Trial Court's Rejection 
of His Accord and Satisfaction Argument 
Finally, Almon Milner Covey skirts, but cannot avoid, the real issue - whether the 
trial court properly rejected his accord and satisfaction, election of remedies, and estoppel 
(...continued) 
In this case, the only evidence presented on intent was from Noel Milner Covey, 
because Almon Milner Covey took the (unbelievable) position that he did not read or 
review the Loan Accommodation Agreement before he signed it. [R. 1023, Tr. 238, 240-
241, 261-262]. This patent attempt to escape the consequences of his execution of the 
agreement is of no avail - it is black letter law that a party cannot escape a signed 
contract by claiming he did not read or understand it. See Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 
67, 73 (Utah 1998) (u[0]ne party to an agreement does not have a duty to ensure that the 
other party has a complete and accurate understanding of all terms embodied in a written 
contract. Rather, each party has the burden to read and understand the terms of a contract 
before he or she affixes his or her signature to it. A party may not sign a contract and 
thereafter assert ignorance or failure to read the contract as a defense."). 
Appellant's argument that the Loan Accommodation Agreement's grant of authority to 
Ms. Covey to take title of the Walker Lane property "in lieu of Almon Milner Covey's 
repayment fails for exactly this same reason. Noel Milner Covey did not choose to take 
the proceeds from the sale of the Walker Lane property "in lieu of her other remedies, 
which were expressly preserved by the very agreement upon which Appellant relies. [R. 
624-625, Findings of Fact ^  66-75, 78]; [R. 100022]. 
Rather, Noel Milner Covey chose to pursue her other remedies, and was awarded 
specific performance, which the trial court accomplished (in part) by ordering that Noel 
Milner Covey use the collateral of the proceeds from the Walker Lane property to replace 
some of her stock. [R. 628-629, Conclusions of Law fflj 7-10]. 
defenses. [Appellant's Brief at 15-16]. 
Since this case was properly tried to the bench, the trial court's findings of fact on 
this issue are subject to substantial deference. See Tanner, 2001 UT 18 at f^ 2. The trial 
court considered the testimony, and made clear and unequivocal findings of fact, which 
covered no less than 21 paragraphs directed specifically to Almon Milner Covey's 
defenses. [R. 622-626, Findings of Fact fflf 61-81]. The findings include the following: 
63. Noel Milner Covey retained the net proceeds of the Walker 
Lane Sale as a form of escrow, collateral and security for Almon Milner 
Covey's obligations to repurchase and restore the Sears Stock and its 
progeny, and for obligations of Almon Milner Covey to her. . . . 
66. Noel Milner Covey never agreed to accept the net proceeds 
from the Walker Lane sale as satisfaction of any of Almon Milner 
Covey's obligations to her. 
67. Noel Milner Covey did not retain the net sales proceeds of the 
Walker Lane sale pursuant to any common understanding, or any accord 
and satisfaction, with Almon Milner Covey and retain the net sales 
proceeds as satisfaction of any of Almon Milner Covey's debts. . . . 
71. Noel Milner Covey repeatedly testified that she had never 
entered or reached any such agreement or understanding [to take the net 
proceeds of the Walker Lane sale in complete satisfaction of all of Almon 
Milner Covey's debts] with her brother. The Court found Noel Milner 
Covey's testimony on this issue to be credible and believable. . . . 
74. Almon Milner Covey introduced insufficient evidence to 
carry his burden of proof that an accord and satisfaction existed. 
75. Noel Milner Covey's receipt of the net sales proceeds from 
Walker Lane did not constitute an election of remedies or an accord. 
Instead, the proceeds were retained by Noel Milner Covey as collateral for 
Almon Milner Covey's performance of his obligations to restore her Sears 
Stock. . . . 
78. Almon Milner Covey failed to carry his burden of proof that 
Noel Milner Covey elected a remedy. . . . 
[R. 624-625, Findings of Fact fflf 63, 66-67, 71, 74-75, 78] (emphasis added). These 
findings were supported by substantial evidence. [R. 1023-1024, Tr. 143,168-169, 170, 
174,231,346,370]. 
In sum, Appellant's argument that the trial court "appears" to have mis-read the 
Loan Accommodation Agreement, and therefore failed as a matter of law to find an 
accord and satisfaction, an election of remedies, and/or an estoppel, must be rejected. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT ALMON MILNER 
COVEY FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF PROOF FOR HIS 
MITIGATION OF DAMAGES DEFENSE 
Almon Milner Covey next tries to divert the Court by focusing on a so-called issue 
of "tax consequence." To do so, he first asserts the wrong standard of review. Then, he 
claims - incorrectly - that the trial court's "entire basis" for rejecting Almon Milner 
Covey's mitigation of damages defense was that Noel Milner Covey "would have 
incurred an immediate detriment" if she had bought replacement stock in her own name 
with the Walker Lane proceeds. [Appellant's Brief at 18]. Without even attempting to 
marshal the evidence, Almon Milner Covey next claims there was "no evidence" to 
support this conclusion. Finally, Almon Milner Covey assumes that if these first 
arguments are correct, then he has met his burden to show a failure to mitigate by Noel 
Milner Covey. All of these arguments fail. 
A. Almon Milner Covey Misstates the Proper Standard of Review 
Relying upon cases involving the assessment of taxes by governmental entities 
(and therefore the interpretation of statutes), Almon Milner Covey asserts that the trial 
court's finding of fact as to whether Noel Milner Covey would have incurred detrimental 
tax consequences if she had bought the Sears stock in her own name is one of law. 
[Appellant's Brief at 18]. This was not, and is not, the issue. 
Almon Milner Covey makes this argument as a round-about way is attempting to 
challenge the trial court's finding that he did not meet his burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that Noel Milner Covey failed to mitigate damages. [R. 
631, Conclusions of Law fflf 18-19]. This issue, based upon the trial court's evaluation of 
the facts, is reviewed deferentially. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 936; see also Rdd, 776 P.2d at 
907 (holding that the "commercial reasonableness of mitigation efforts is a fact 
question"). Thus, the evidence on mitigation of damages must be construed in the light 
most favorable to Noel Milner Covey. 
Furthermore, because Almon Milner Covey misapplies the standard of review and 
fails to marshal the evidence, the trial court's findings are presumed to be based in the 
For example, the court in Utah State Retirement Office v. Salt Lake County, 780 
P.2d 813 (Utah 1989), explicitly noted that "[t]here is no factual dispute in the instant 
case." Id. at 815. The case was entirely concerned with statutory interpretation. Id. at 
815-816. Such is not the case here. 
Almon Milner Covey's remaining citations on the standard of review are similarly 
inapplicable, yet they acknowledge that an issue of fact is reviewed deferentially. See 
Atlas Steel v.Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2002 YT 112, ffl[ 14-16, 61 P.3d 1053 
(interpreting statutory language, but applying different standard of review to questions of 
fact); Hercules. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2000 Utah App. 372, ^ 6,21 P.3d 231 
(interpreting tax code); Nestle Holdings. Inc. v. C.I.R.. 152 F.3d 83, 86 (2nd Cir. 1998) 
(reviewing interpretation of tax code as a matter of law, but applying deferential review 
of factual determinations). 
evidence. See Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) ("If the appellant fails 
to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record supports the findings 
of the trial court."). This court may reject Almon Milner Covey's appeal of this issue on 
this basis alone. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Found that Almon Milner Covey Did Not 
Meet His Burden on His Mitigation of Damages Defense 
1. The Trial Court Had Other Reasons, Besides the Tax 
Consequences, for Finding That Noel Milner Covey Did Not Fail 
to Mitigate Damages 
Almon Milner Covey's attempt to focus upon on the "tax consequences" is 
misplaced. The trial court also found that there were other reasons that Noel Milner 
Covey did not fail in her duty to mitigate damages. 
First, the trial court found that a primary reason Noel Milner Covey did not use the 
proceeds from the sale of the Walker Lane property to replace the Sears stock was 
because of the actions of her brother, the Appellant: 
69. At Almon Milner Covey's direction, Noel Milner Covey 
deposited the net proceeds of the Walker Lane sale in a money market 
account. . . . 
72. Prior to and after the Walker Lane sale, both parties were 
continually disputing the amount to be paid by Almon Milner Covey to 
Noel Milner Covey, the method and manner of the repurchase and return of 
the Sears Stock, whether Almon Milner Covey was to repurchase the Sears 
Stock and return it in certificate form, whether the stock was to be 
purchased by Noel Milner Covey, and the amount of other obligations 
owed by Almon Milner Covey to Noel Milner Covey. 
73. There was no common agreement or understanding reached 
between Noel Milner Covey and Almon Milner Covey at any time in 
relation to recording the Warranty Deed, in relation to the net proceeds of 
the Walker Lane sale held in escrow, in relation to the repurchase of the 
Sears Stock and its progeny, or in relation to the total amount due and 
owing by Almon Milner Covey to Noel Milner Covey that would constitute 
the basis for an accord. 
[R. 623-624, Findings of Fact ^ 69, 72-73]; [R. 1023-1024, Tr. 143, 168-169, 170-175, 
216,231, 370, 392] (emphasis added). 
In addition, Noel Milner Covey was not required to mitigate damages because the 
intent of the parties at the time of the Loan Accommodation Agreement (and at all times) 
was that she would recover the loaned stock - and not that she would be compensated 
otherwise:15 
6. Noel Milner Covey did not intend to transfer ownership of the 
Sears Stock to Almon Milner Covey. She always wanted the Sears Stock 
returned by Almon Milner Covey, in part, to avoid capital gains. . . . 
16. It was always anticipated by the parties that the Sears Stock 
would be returned to Noel Milner Covey. . . . 
19. Almon Milner Covey had the primary duty for performance 
under the Loan Accommodation Agreement; his primary duty of 
performance included the duty to return or restore the Sears Stock and its 
progeny to Noel Milner Covey. . . . 
75. Noel Milner Covey's receipt of the net sales proceeds from 
Walker Lane did not constitute an election of remedies or an accord. 
Instead, the proceeds were retained by Noel Milner Covey as collateral for 
Almon Milner Covey's performance of this obligation to restore her Sears 
Stock. 
[R. 614-616, 625; Findings of Fact Ht 6,16,19, 75]; [R. 1023-1024, Tr. 73, 149-150. 
228-229, 346, 369]. 
15
 Almon Milner Covey does not challenge the trial court's award of specific 
performance, except in the limited particular that he argues that securities cases should 
apply to limit Noel Milner Covey's damages. [Appellant's Brief at 27-30]. As noted 
infra, this argument fails because it is inapplicable to the legal theories and facts of this 
case. See infra pp. 44-45. 
The trial court properly concluded that Noel Milner Covey was entitled to take 
custodial possession of the proceeds from the sale of the Walker Lane property, and 
Almon Milner Covey does not challenge these findings, or the evidence supporting the 
findings, on appeal. Thus, his challenge to the trial court's findings and conclusions on 
mitigation of damages must be rejected. 
2. The Test for Mitigation is Not Whether There Was Irrefutable 
Proof of an Adverse Tax Consequence, But Rather Only 
Whether Noel Milner Covey Acted Reasonably 
Almon Milner Covey's unsupported assertion there would not have been tax 
consequences16 if Noel Milner Covey had bought stock in her own name with the Walker 
Lane proceeds assumes that Noel Milner Covey's reasonable concern of adverse tax 
consequences is not enough to defeat his mitigation argument. This assumption is 
incorrect - the test for mitigation is whether the party charged with the duty to mitigate 
acted "reasonably" under the circumstances. See, ej*., Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of 
Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983) (holding that mitigation of damages rule applies to 
reasonable means for avoiding or minimizing damages); Gierke v. Walker, 927 P.2d 524, 
527 (Mont. 1996) (holding that a "damaged party is only expected to do what is 
reasonable under the circumstances and need not embark upon a course of action which 
may cause further detriment or harm.") (emphasis added). 
16
 It is noteworthy that this argument was not supported by any evidence at trial. 
Indeed, Almon Milner Covey does not, and cannot, cite to any such evidence in his brief. 
[Appellant's Brief at 18-20]. Thus, Almon Milner Covey asks this Court to simply 
assume the truth of his representation - the very thing for which he tries to criticize the 
trial court. 
In this case, regardless of what Almon Milner Covey believed, it is clear that Noel 
Milner Covey had a reasonable fear that by purchasing the stock in her own name with 
the proceeds of the Walker Sale property, she would face tax consequences. [R. 617, 
623, Findings of Fact 1ffl 29, 68]; [R. 1023-1024, Tr. 319-320, 369, 380-382]. In fact, the 
trial court heard testimony that for this reason Noel Milner Covey repeatedly asked 
Almon Milner Covey to purchase the Sears stock in his own name, after which it would 
be returned to her, but that he refused to do so. On this evidence, the trial court properly 
held that Almon Milner Covey cannot now be heard to complain. [R. 617-618, 624, 631-
632; Findings of Fact fflf 29-30, 63-65, 72]; [R. 1023-1024, Tr. 171-174, 346, 361, 380-
382, 388, 391-392]; [Conclusions of Law ^ 18-19]; see also Anesthesiologists Assoc, v. 
St. Benedicts Hospital 852 P.2d 1030, 1040 (Utah App. 1997) (plaintiff not required to 
undertake financially risky venture to mitigate damages); Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 
692, 695 (Utah 1982) (defendant who chose not to perform when costs would have been 
lower, could not complain about the increased cost of performance after trial). 
3. The Trial Court's Conclustion that Noel Milner Covey Acted 
Reasonably is Supported by the Evidence 
The trial court also had abundant evidence upon which to base its finding that 
Noel Milner Covey acted reasonably in refusing to purchase stock in her own name, due 
to the potential adverse tax consequences. The trial court found: 
6. Noel Milner Covey did not intend to transfer ownership of the 
Sears Stock to Almon Milner Covey. She always wanted the Sears Stock 
returned by Almon Milner Covey, in part, to avoid capital gains. . . . 
29. Noel Milner Covey took the position with Almon Milner 
Covey that the Sears Stock and its progeny would need to be replaced and 
returned to her by Almon Milner Covey, or by Noel Milner Covey acting as 
his agent, in order to avoid capital gains tax to her. . . . 
68. Had Noel Milner Covey utilized the Walker Lane Sales 
proceeds to purchase replacement shares of the Sears Stock, she would 
have incurred an immediate detriment in the form of capital gains taxes 
which she would not have occurred [sic] had Almon Milner Covey returned 
the Sears Stock and its progeny timely. 
[R. 614, 617, 623, Findings of Factlffl 6, 29, 68]; [R. 1023-1024, Tr. 174, 319-320, 369, 
380-382]. 
In fact, Almon Milner Covey admitted that he was well aware not only of the tax 
consequences, but that Noel Milner Covey had professional, legal advice from her 
attorney William Vogel in this regard:17 
Q. Now, during any of these conversations with your sister, had you 
talked to her about her potential tax liability? 
A. No, I didn't, but her attorney did with me. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Bill Vogel 
[R. 1024, Tr. 319-320]. Moments later in his testimony, Almon Milner Covey again 
acknowledged the potential adverse tax consequences to his sister, when he claimed that 
17
 This testimony was presented without objection - because it was elicited by 
Almon Milner Covey's own attorney. Almon Milner Covey cannot now be heard to 
complain that it is incompetent evidence. See, e^ g., Cook Associated, Inc. v. Warnick, 
664 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Utah 1983) ("Since the record reveals that there was no objection 
on the basis of hearsay, that theory cannot now be raised on appeal.") (citing Utah R. 
Evid. 4; Obradovich v. Walker Brothers Bankers, 80 Utah 587, 602-04, 16 P.2d 212, 217-
18 (1932); In re Van Alstine?s Estate, 26 Utah 193,203-05, 72 P. 942, 945-46 (1903)). 
he offered to pay her tax liability.18 [R. 1024, Tr. 319-320]. The trial court rejected this 
testimony, finding that Noel Milner Covey held the proceeds from the sale of the Walker 
Lane property in escrow, pending resolution of the issues, including the tax liability issue, 
which was never resolved between the parties. [R. 623-624, Findings of Fact fflf 69-73]; 
[R. 1023-1024, Tr. 143, 168-169, 170-175,216, 231, 370, 392]. 
In sum, Almon Milner Covey's argument about whether tax consequences would 
occur, and his attempt to bootstrap this argument into one on mitigation of damages, 
should be rejected. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ENTER CONTRADICTORY FINDINGS 
OF FACT, AND CORRECTLY REJECTED APPELLANT'S ACCORD 
AND SATISFACTION ARGUMENTS 
Almon Milner Covey next attacks the trial court's rejection of his accord and 
satisfaction argument, using as the basis for his argument the (incorrect) assertion that 
three paragraphs of the Findings of Fact are, somehow, inconsistent. [Appellant's Brief at 
Almon Milner Covey also asserts that, somehow, his self-serving testimony as 
to his purported willingness to pay Noel Milner Covey's tax liability justifies reversal. 
[Appellant's Brief at 19]. Almon Milner Covey's testimony does no such thing - but, if 
believed, his testimony confirms that the threat of adverse tax consequences was a very 
real issue. 
The assertion that the trial court "ignored" Almon Milner Covey's testimony is 
equally meritless - the Court simply found "Noel Milner Covey's testimony [on the 
accord and satisfaction issues] to be credible and believable," and thus rejected Almon 
Milner Covey's testimony as lacking in credibility. [R. 624, Findings of Fact 71]; [R. 
1023, Tr. 143, 168-169, 170-171]. Indeed, the trial court heard evidence directly contrary 
to Almon Milner Covey's self serving testimony about his purported willingness to pay 
any tax consequences, as Noel Milner Covey denied any such conversation. [R. 1024, 
Tr. 390-391]. 
20-30]. The assertion of inconsistency is a cover for Almon Milner Covey's real 
argument - that this Court should weigh the evidence differently than did the trial court. 
A. The Three Findings of Fact Are Not Inconsistent 
Almon Milner Covey argues that Findings of Fact 62, 63, and 67 are inconsistent, 
because Finding 62 is to the effect that the proceeds from the Walker Lane sale were held 
"not by the written Loan Accommodation Agreement but by another, new, oral security 
agreement"; because Finding 63 is to the effect the funds were to be held in "escrow"; 
and because Finding 64 was that the funds were held "by no agreement at all." 
[Appellant's Brief at 22]. Notably lacking from this 'analysis' is an accurate quotation of 
the three purportedly contradictory findings. 
Read in context, these findings are entirely consistent, and simply reflect the fact 
that Noel Milner Covey only agreed to allow the sale of the Walker Lane property if the 
proceeds would be held by her in trust, that this process was never intended by the parties 
to constitute Noel Milner Covey's sole and only remedy under the Loan Accommodation 
Agreement, and that the funds were held while the parties tried to resolve the dispute -
which resolution never happened:19 
19
 Almon Milner Covey's argument suffers from other fatal flaws. Even if the 
three Findings of Fact were inconsistent, Almon Milner Covey never explains the legal 
significance of his argument. There is no rule that party is entitled to reversal, or even 
remand, just because findings of fact may be interpreted as at-odds with each other. In 
fact, the opposite is true. See, e^ , American Theatre Co. v. Glasmann. 95 Utah 303, 80 
P2d 922, 924 (Utah 1938) (holding that even though "the findings are definitely, clearly 
and positively contradictory," there would be no reversal); see also Mulligan v. Capitol 
Furniture Co., 8 Utah 2.d 383; 335 P.2d 619, 622 (Utah 1959) (holding that inconsistent 
special verdict answers were immaterial). 
(continued...) 
62. Noel Milner Covey consented to remove her Notice of 
Interest on the Walker Lane property so that the Walker Lane Sale could 
proceed but only if the net proceeds of the sale of the Walker Lane property 
were to be left with her as a form of collateral and security for Almon's 
duty to return the Sears Stock and restore her to the position she would 
have been in had he timely returned the Sears Stock. 
63. Noel Milner Covey retained the net proceeds of the Walker 
Lane Sale as a form of escrow, collateral and security for Almon Milner 
Covey's obligations to repurchase and restore the Sears Stock and its 
progeny, and for obligations of Almon Milner Covey to her.[20] 
67. Noel Milner Covey did not retain the net sales proceeds of the 
Walker Lane Sale pursuant to any common understanding, or any accord 
and satisfaction, with Almon Milner Covey and retain the net sales 
proceeds as satisfaction of any of Almon Milner Covey's debts. 
[R. 622-623, Findings of Fact tH 63, 62, 67]; [R. 1023-1024, Tr. 143, 168-170, 174, 231, 
346, 370]. 
Almon Milner Covey's argument about the purportedly "contradictory" facts is 
nothing more than an attempt to distract the Court into departing from the appropriate 
standard of review. The argument boils down to a disagreement with how the trial court 
weighed the evidence. [See Appellant's Brief at 22, arguing that none of the three 
(...continued) 
Further, even if the findings were inconsistent, any one of the findings is sufficient 
to defeat Almon Milner Covey's argument that there was only one remedy allowed under 
the Loan Accommodation Agreement, or that an accord and satisfaction was reached. 
Thus, even if viewed as findings in the alternative, the Findings of Fact stand. 
20
 Appellant's Brief strip-quotes this finding, omitting the words "collateral and 
security" from the phrase "escrow, collateral and security," and leaving only the word 
"escrow." Then, Almon Milner Covey asserts that the finding of an "escrow" in Finding 
of Fact 63 is inconsistent with the "collateral and security" language in Finding of Fact 
62. This is beyond legitimate argument - clearly the same meaning is ascribed to Ms. 
Covey's retention of the proceeds from the sale of the Walker Lane property in the two 
paragraphs. 
Findings of Fact "is supported by substantial evidence when considering such evidence in 
light of the contradictory provisions of the written Loan Accommodation Agreement and 
the evidence (e.g. in the testimony of Almon Milner Covey and the actions of the parties) 
that the Walker Lane Sale proceeds were given to Ms. Covey in lieu of the Sears stock."]. 
B. Almon Milner Covey Fails to Properly Marshal the Evidence 
Almon Milner Covey makes a half-hearted attempt to marshal the evidence. 
[Appellant's Brief at 21-22]. This attempt fails in the first instance, as the marshaling rule 
requires that Almon Milner Covey "must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial [that] supports the very findings 
[he] resists." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 
1991). Almon Milner Covey does not even cite to the record, and ignores the substantial 
evidence (discussed in the next section) supporting the trial court's rejection of his accord 
and satisfaction defense. 
C. The Trial Court Properly Rejected Almon Milner Covey's Accord and 
Satisfaction Defense 
Almon Milner Covey ignores and fails to challenge the repeated testimony from 
his sister to the effect that she never agreed with Almon Milner Covey that the Walker 
Lane proceeds would satisfy all his debts. [R. 624-625, Findings of Fact fflf 63, 66-67, 
71, 74-75, 78]; [R. 1023-1024, Tr. 143, 168-169, 170, 174, 231, 346, 370]. Of course, 
since the "party alleging accord and satisfaction has the burden of proving that there has 
been a definite meeting of the minds on a new and substitute contract," the trial court's 
finding of no agreement is determinative. United American Life Insurance Co. v. Zions 
First National Bank, 641 P.2d 158,160 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added). Indeed, on cross-
examination, Almon Milner Covey admitted that he had never told his sister to record the 
warranty deed to satisfy his debts. [R. 1023, Tr. 231]. 
Almon Milner Covey's request that this Court weigh the evidence, and find his 
testimony more credible than did the trial court, utterly fails. The Utah Supreme Court 
rejected a similar argument in Bruner v. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153 (Utah 1996): 
Although [appellant] told a very different story, we cannot hold that 
the district court's findings of fact are against the clear weight of evidence. 
See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). [Appellant] and 
[Appellee] simply told two differing versions of pivotal events. There was 
no evidence to corroborate either side's testimony. The district court found 
[Appellee] more credible . . . Trial courts are accorded great discretion in 
determining factual matters. They are in the best position to assess the 
credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole. 
State v, Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 787 (Utah 1988). When, as here, 
contradictory testimony is offered by two key witnesses, "the fact finder is 
free to weigh the conflicting evidence presented and to draw its own 
conclusions." State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1986). 
Id. at 1158 (emphasis added). As in the Bruner case, Almon Milner Covey cannot prevail 
by asking this Court to weight the evidence differently than the trial court, and his appeal 
of the trial court's rejection of his accord and satisfaction defense must be denied. 
V. THE TRIAL JUDGE CORRECTLY ORDERED THE EQUITABLE 
REMEDY OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
Almon Milner Covey challenges the trial court's discretion, applying the proper 
standard of review for the first time in his brief. Then, contrary to the rules of appellate 
review, Almon Milner Covey proceeds to argue the evidence, and to do so without even 
citing to the record. 
A. Almon Milner Covey's Challenge to Finding of Specific Performance is 
Nothing More Than an Argument on the Weight of the Evidence, 
Which He Has Not Marshaled 
Almon Milner Covey first argues that the trial court "ignored the obviously unfair 
position" that Noel Milner Covey held the Walker Lane proceeds "which prevented 
Almon Milner Covey from being able to buy replacement shares." [Appellants Brief at 
28]. This is nothing more than an attempt to re-argue the evidence. The Court should 
resolve this issue against Almon Milner Covey by simply applying the deferential 
standard of review appropriate for findings of fact, in particular because Almon Milner 
Covey again fails to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's findings of fact in 
support of its order of specific performance. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Ignore Almon Milner Covey's Argument 
About Specific Performance - It Was Flatly Rejected. 
In addition, Almon Milner Covey's argument is wrong. The trial court did not 
ignore Almon Milner Covey's argument - it squarely rejected it, because it found that 
Almon Milner Covey refused to purchase the Sears stock in his own name, and return it 
to Noel Milner Covey. As noted above, this refusal placed Noel Milner Covey in the 
untenable position of having to risk adverse tax consequences. Almon Milner Covey 
could have easily addressed this problem, if he had been genuine in his resolve to make 
Noel Milner Covey whole - he could have simply agreed with Noel Milner Covey to use 
the Walker Lane proceeds to purchase the Sears stock in his own name for her benefit, 
Almon Milner Covey argues that he could not have purchased the stock because 
Noel Milner Covey would not give him the money from the sale of the Walker Lane 
(continued...) 
but he did not. [R. 617, 622-625, Findings of Fact fflj 29-30, 62-64, 68-69, 72, 75 ]; [R. 
1023-1024, Tr. 171, 174, 319-320, 346, 361, 369, 380-382, 388, 391-392 ]. Almon 
Milner Covey cannot therefore complain that it was he, and not Noel Milner Covey, who 
was put in the unfair position. 
C. Almon Milner Covey Waived the Specific Performance Argument He 
Now Makes by Failing to Raise it Before the Trial Court 
Almon Milner Covey next relies upon a string of securities fraud cases, asserting 
that the trial court's entry of specific performance is really an issue of damages. 
[Appellant's Brief at 27-30]. 
This argument should be summarily rejected, as it was never raised at the trial 
court level, either by motion, in Almon Milner Covey's trial brief, or during opening or 
closing argument. [R. 459-471]; [R. 1023-1024, Tr. 40-64, 450-502]. It is perhaps for 
this reason that Almon Milner Covey's Statement of Issues violates the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure by failing to provide a "citation to the record showing that the issue 
was preserved in the trial court." Utah R. App. P.24(a)(5). Regardless, the argument has 
been waived, as "[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, this court will not consider issues 
(...continued) 
house. [Appellant's Brief at 25]. Almon Milner Covey seems to imply that Noel Milner 
Covey should have given him the proceeds of the sale - despite the fact that he would 
never agree to reduce any such agreement to writing. [R. 1024, Tr. 391]. 
Noel Milner Covey cannot be faulted for not turning over more than one million 
dollars in cash to her brother without adequate, written protection, after his theft of 
$100,000 from her personal account at his stock brokerage, ultimately resulting in a loss 
of approximately $55,000. [R. 618-619, Findings of Fact ffl|33-43]; [R- 1023-1024, Tr. 
65, 81-82, 87-89, 92-94, 96-97, 112, 114-115, 119-120, 122, 168-129, 134-138, 144-147, 
211, 221-223, 268-269, 274, 278]. 
raised for the first time on appeal." See, e^ , State v. Mabe. 864 P.2d 890, 893 n.6 (Utah 
1993). This rule is based, in part, on the principle that it is unfair to fault the trial court for 
failing to rule correctly on an issue it was never given the opportunity to consider. See 
State v.Peterson. 121 Utah 229, 236,240 P.2d 504, 507 (1952). 
D. The Securities Fraud Cases Are Inapplicable 
The securities fraud cases cited by Appellant have no bearing on the facts of this 
case. First, Almon Milner Covey's argument is one of damages, not specific 
performance. Indeed, not a single case cited in Appellant's brief addresses the issue of 
specific performance. Here, the elements of a cause of action for specific performance 
were considered by the trial court, and found to be met. The findings are not challenged 
on appeal. Thus, the securities cases are inapplicable. 
Second, none of the securities cases cited by Almon Milner Covey involved a 
claim for breach of a loan of stock, but rather all involve the sale or other ownership 
rights. In this case, the uncontroverted testimony was that the entire purpose of the Loan 
Accommodation Agreement was a loan for only one purpose, to act as collateral on 
Almon Milner Covey's personal margin account. There was never a margin call on 
Almon Milner Covey's account. Nor do any of the cited cases involve a party like Noel 
Milner Covey, whose entire purpose, at all times, was to obtain the return of specific and 
particular stock. It was these particular facts, among others, that supported the trial 
court's order of specific performance. [R. 614-615, 617, 623, Findings of Fact fflf 6, 11, 
16, 29-30, 63-68]; [R. 1023-1024, Tr. 73, 143,159, 168-174, 228-229, 231, 346, 361, 
369-370, 380-382, 388, 391-392]. 
Third, none of the cited cases involve potential adverse tax consequences, as were 
faced by Noel Milner Covey in this case, if specific performance were not ordered. [See 
supra pp. 32-37]. 
Finally, even assuming there was some validity to Almon Milner Covey's "wait 
and see" argument, the very policy reasons behind the cited securities cases weigh against 
Almon Milner Covey. If the Court were to accept Almon Milner Covey's argument, it 
would, in effect, reward Almon Milner Covey's bad conduct. If the Court finds that Noel 
Milner Covey in only entitled to damages based on the value of the stock at the time of 
the breach, then it allows Almon Milner Covey - a stockbroker who is familiar with the 
risks of securities trading - to gain the benefit of the wait and see approach. If the stock 
price falls after Almon Milner Covey's breach, he can assert that Noel Milner Covey was 
damaged only by the reduced value of the stock, as the value of the stock was less at the 
time of trial or judgment than when it was lost. If the stock price rises, and Almon 
Milner Covey is only liable for the amount of damages as of the date of the loss (even 
though he may have held the stock until that time). This is not, and cannot be, the intent 
of the doctrine urged by Almon Milner Covey. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT ALMON MILNER 
COVEY WAS A FIDUCIARY TO NOEL MILNER COVEY, AND WAS 
PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR MONEY TAKEN FROM NOEL MILNER 
COVEY'S ACCOUNT AND PUT INTO HIS ACCOUNT 
A. The Trial Court's Finding of Liability for the Funds Transferred from 
Noel Milner Covey's Account to Almon Milner Covey's Personal Error 
Account Was Not Based Upon a Piercing the Corporate Veil Theory 
Almon Milner Covey first tries to re-define the issue by assuming, without any 
support, that the judgment on this issue was based upon the trial court's piercing of the 
corporate veil of Covey & Co, Almon Milner Covey's stock brokerage. [Appellant's 
Brief at 31-32]. However, Noel Milner Covey's claim for the loss of the $55,484.15 was 
not based upon an alter-ego theory, but rather upon the direct fiduciary relationship 
Almon Milner Covey had to his sister and client, Noel Milner Covey, as her only broker 
at Covey & Co. and as the only person with any authority over her account. [R. 618-619; 
629-630; Findings of Fact f|f 33-43; Conclusions of Law 1fi| 11-13]; [R. 1023-1024, Tr. 
65, 81-82, 87-89, 92-94, 96-97, 112,114-115, 119-120, 122, 168-129,134-138, 144-147, 
211, 221-223,268-269, 274, 278]. Indeed, the Amended Complaint did not bring a claim 
to pierce the corporate veil, but instead brought a direct claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty. [R. 98] 
Nor does Almon Milner Covey dispute the trial court's legal determination that, as 
Noel Milner Covey's stockbroker, Almon Milner Covey as an individual owed a 
fiduciary duty to his client. [R. 629, Conclusion of Law Tf^f 11-14]; see also Davis v. 
Merrill Lynch Pearce Firmer & Smith, 906 F.2d 1206, 1214-15 (8th Cir. 1990); Jaksichv. 
Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc.. 582 F. Supp. 485, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
B. Abundant Evidence, Including His Own Admissions, Support the 
Finding of Personal Liability Against Almon Milner Covey for the Loss 
of Funds from His Sister's Covey & Co. Stock Account 
Furthermore, although not directly challenged by Almon Milner Covey, there was 
abundant evidence of Almon Milner Covey's fiduciary duty to his sister and client, and 
that Almon Milner Covey breached that fiduciary duty, including the following: 
• As of the date of the conversion of Noel Milner Covey's stock, Almon 
Milner Covey was the only stockbrocker authorized to engage in any 
activity on Noel Milner Covey's account. [R. 618, Findings of Fact ^ f 33]. 
• Almon Milner Covey, was as her (only) stockbroker a fiduciary to Noel 
Milner Covey. [R. 618, 629, Findings of Fact f 34, Conclusions of Law f^ 
12]. 
• On September 30, 1992, Noel Milner Covey's stock account at Covey & 
Co. was converted from a cash account to a margin account, without her 
knowledge or authorization. [R. 618, Findings of Fact ffif 35-36]. 
• Also on September 30, 1992, $100,000 was taken from Noel Milner 
Covey's account at Covey & Co., without her knowledge or authorization, 
and was transferred to Almon Milner Covey's internal error account at 
Covey & Co. [R. 619, Finding of Fact ffi[ 37-38]. 
• Subsequently, some, but not all, of the $100,000 was transferred from 
Almon Milner Covey's internal account at Covey & Co. back into Noel 
Milner Covey's account at Covey & Co. [R. 619, Finding of Fact f 39]. 
[R. 1023-1024, Tr. 65, 81-82, 87-89, 92-94, 96-97, 112, 114-115, 119-120, 122, 168-129, 
134-138, 144-147, 211, 221-223, 268-269, 274, 278]. Indeed, Almon Milner Covey 
admitted that, as the only broker with authority over his sister's account, he should be 
personally liable for the loss. [R. 1024, Tr. 274]. 
Thus, the smoke screen of Almon Milner Covey's argument about alter-ego and 
piercing the corporate veil should be ignored, and the trial court's award of damages for 
Almon Milner Covey's individual breach of his fiduciary duty should be affirmed. 
VII. NOEL MILNER COVEY IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS INCURRED ON APPEAL 
The trial court awarded Noel Milner Covey attorney fees and costs pursuant to the 
written attorney fee provision in the Loan Accommodation Agreement. [R. 635, 
Conclusion of Law U 34]; [R. 100023]. Almon Milner Covey does not appeal the trial 
court's award of attorney fees and costs. [Appellant's Brief at 2-3 (Statement of Issues)]. 
As noted, the judgment should be affirmed. Thus, Noel Milner Covey is entitled 
to recover her fees incurred on appeal. See R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 
936 P.2d 1068, 1081 (Utah 1997) (where party entitled to attorney fees below prevails on 
appeal, award of attorney fees on appeal is proper); Management Servs. Corp. v. 
Development Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980) (holding that contract provision 
allowing for attorney fees includes those fees incurred on appeal as well as at trial). 
Accordingly, Noel Milner Covey requests this Court award her all attorney fees and costs 
incurred on appeal. 
[Remainder of page intentionally left blank] 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the district court's entry of 
judgment. In addition, the Court should award Noel Milner Covey her attorney fees and 
costs incurred on appeal. 
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settlement conference. 
5. Failure to appear at the pretrial settlement conference may result in 
default. 
6. The foregoing dates should be considered firm settings and will not be 
modified without Court order, and then only upon a showing of manifest injustice. Counsel 
are instructed to stay in contact with the clerk of this court as the trial date 
approaches regarding the trial setting. 
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1. This case is set for Jury trial on 1-16-01 at 10:00 a.m. 
2. Anticipated trial time is 4 day(s). 
3. This case is set for jury trial. Counsel are to submit an agreed set of jury 
instructions to the Court at the time of the pretrial conference. Objected to instructions and 
proposed voir dire questions along with a "courtesy copy" are to be submitted separately 
at the pretrial conference. 
4. A final pretrial settlement conference will be held on 1-3-01 at 8:30 a.m. Trial 
counsel and clients, or individual(s) with authority to settle this case are required to be 
present. Out of State parties must be available by phone at the time of the pretrial 
settlement conference. 
5. Failure to appear at the pretrial settlement conference may result in 
default. 
6. The foregoing dates should be considered firm settings and will not be 
modified without Court order, and then only upon a showing of manifest injustice. Counsel 
are instructed to stay in contact with the clerk of this court as the trial date 
approaches regarding the trial setting. 
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AFFIRMED. 
Before: ALDISERT, [FN*1 HUG and 
SCHROEDER, Circuit Judges. 
MEMORANDUM rFN**1 
**1 Anthony Grant appeals the district court's 
judgment following a bench trial in favor of the City 
of Los Angeles and several of its police officers on 
charges of police brutality brought under 42 U.S.C. $ 
1983 and arising from his arrest for car-jacking. 
Both in his brief and at oral argument, Appellant 
Grant has limited the scope of our inquiry to the 
primary issue before us, whether the district court 
abused its discretion in ordering a bench trial after the 
parties failed to respect its pre-trial order that they 
furnish the court with a "clean" set of proposed jury 
instructions and a form of special verdict one week 
prior to trial. 
Copr. © West 2003 No < 
Page 2 
I. 
The district court's pre-trial order dated January 3, 
1993, provided in relevant part: 
Counsel note this court's standard order (contained 
in the post-status conference order) regarding 
preparation and submission of jury instructions. 
Failure timely to serve and file jury instructions 
(and form of special verdict if required below) will 
be deemed a waiver of jury trial by the parties so 
failing. 
The matter will be submitted to the jury on a form 
of special verdict. The parties are to attempt to 
agree on a form of special verdict and are to submit 
the agreed form, or each party's proposed form in 
the event of non-agreement, with the jury 
instructions. 
E.R. at 46. A special verdict form was ordered 
because of the large number of defendants in the case 
and the listing of qualified immunity as a defense in 
the pre-trial conference order. Id. at 52. 
After both Appellant and Appellees failed to observe 
the deadline, the court noted that their noncompliance 
had seriously inconvenienced it and obstructed it in 
its trial preparation. The practice of the district court 
was to provide the jury with a copy of the proposed 
instructions and form of special verdict prior to trial. 
The court told the parties that time was of the essence 
in order for it to review the submissions before trial. 
Because the parties failed to comply with the court's 
pre-trial order, causing delay and prejudice to the 
efficient administration of justice, the court 
determined that it had no alternative but to invoke its 
previously announced sanction—jury trial waiver. It 
considered, but declined to accept, Appellant's 
suggestion that it sanction counsel rather than deny 
him a jury trial. 
The court noted that although Grant timely 
demanded a jury trial and timely submitted a set of 
jury instructions, the proposed instructions were not 
"clean," that is, devoid of case citations for 
distribution to the jury. Additionally, Grant failed to 
adhere to the deadline for submission of a special 
verdict form, producing it on the day of trial, seven 
days late. Nevertheless, Grant insists that he 
substantially complied with the district court's order 
and that, in any case, the court could have imposed a 
less severe penalty for violation of its order, such as 
monetary sanctions against his counsel. 
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With the case in this posture, it is important to 
emphasize what is not before us. Because Appellant 
has confined our inquiry to whether the district court 
abused its discretion, Brief for Appellant at 11, we 
will not review de novo the validity of the sanction 
itself. See, e.g.. White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d 699 
(9th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 498 U.S. 903 
(1990). Appellant challenges only the application of 
the sanction under the circumstances presented. 
Moreover, because both parties violated the order, we 
are not confronted with a jury waiver sanction 
affecting an innocent party. With the issue so 
narrowly joined, our inquiry is extremely limited: 
**2 Discretion, in this sense, is abused when the 
judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful or 
unreasonable, which is another way of saying that 
discretion is abused only where no reasonable man 
[or woman] would take the view adopted by the 
trial court. If reasonable men [or women] could 
differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the 
trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court 
abused its discretion. 
Delno v. Market St. Rv. Co.. 124 F.2d 965. 967 (9th 
Cir. 1942). 
IL 
We find no abuse here. First, because the court 
provided all parties with adequate notice that 
noncompliance with its order would be deemed a 
waiver of jury trial, we are not faced with the 
circumstances present in Pradier v. Elespuru, 641 
F.2d 808, 811 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The local rule does 
not say that the failure to [comply] ... invalidates the 
demand.") or Lawson v. Kolender, 658 F.2d 1362, 
1372 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Lawson's right to a jury trial 
should not have been denied where he had no 
warning of this severe sanction"). Second, the court 
in this case furnished a reasonable explanation for 
requiring the instructions and special verdict form 
one week before trial, stating that it needed to 
examine the submissions in advance so that there 
would be no delay in starting the trial. It noted that 
the failure of the parties to adhere to the deadline 
seriously hampered its efforts to administer justice. 
This particular judge's preference to distribute the 
jury instructions and special verdict form before trial 
is not to be criticized. 
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in doing 
what it expressly informed Grant it would do in the 
event that its pre-trial order was not respected. 
m. 
Appellant argues also that the court's judgment in 
favor of individual police officers and the City was 
not supported by the evidence. We disagree. 
Grant is a convicted car-jacker who brings a Section 
1983 action alleging police brutality during his arrest. 
He and his companion, Peter Lomar, stole an 
automobile at gunpoint on August 31, 1989. Police 
officers received a dispatch call notifying them of the 
crime and warning them that the two suspects should 
be considered "armed and dangerous." The officers 
located the stolen automobile and followed it with 
flashing lights and blaring sirens. A high-speed 
chase ensued, largely through residential 
neighborhoods. The pursuit ended when the stolen 
automobile crashed into a street sign. 
By the time the first police car arrived on the scene, 
the doors of the stolen automobile were ajar, and the 
suspects missing. Backup police units soon arrived, 
and a multiple-team search of the area was 
conducted. Each search team had a police dog, each 
dog had a handler. The dogs were trained to search a 
designated area for a suspect and, upon locating that 
suspect, to bite him or her unless the handler 
commanded the dog not to bite. According to the 
police, all dogs were trained to stop biting a suspect 
instantly on command. 
**3 Although there is some dispute as to the exact 
location, one of the search teams found Grant hiding 
behind a tree near a six-foot high wall in a residential 
backyard. According to the police, the officers on 
the scene ordered him to come out from behind the 
tree with his hands up. He emerged from behind the 
tree and attempted to escape by climbing the wall. A 
dog handled by Officer Roller, which had already 
been released to search for the suspects, caught the 
fleeing Grant before he reached the top of the wall, 
biting him on the leg. Grant fell to the ground and 
briefly struggled with the dog, at which point the dog 
bit him a second time on the upper arm. Officers 
testified that the dog was called off within five 
seconds. Grant was then handcuffed and escorted to 
a police car. At no point, insist the officers, did 
anyone strike him or allow the dog to bite him after 
he had ceased to pose a threat. 
Appellant alleges that the police officers found him 
hiding and, without warning, allowed the dog to bite 
him repeatedly. He further states that the officers 
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beat him with their flashlights, and possibly batons, 
while shouting racial slurs. He sustained two dog 
bites, one to the upper arm and the second to the 
upper leg. He also broke two small bones, the 
fibulae, a few inches above each ankle. 
The district court concluded that the dog bites did 
not constitute unconstitutionally excessive force in 
light of the circumstances, namely, the apprehension 
of a suspect in a violent felony involving a deadly 
weapon, who had just led the police on a dangerous 
high-speed chase and who resisted arrest by 
attempting to flee into a residential neighborhood on 
foot. 
We will not challenge the factual findings of the 
district court unless clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 
52(a); Kruso v. Int'l Tel & Tel Corp., 872 F.2d 
1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1989). Under this standard, we 
will accept the factual determinations of the district 
court unless they "either (1) [are] completely devoid 
of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue 
of credibility, or (2) bear[ ] no rational relationship to 
the supportive evidentiary data." Krasnov v. Dinan, 
465 F.2d 1298, 1302 (3d Cir. 1972). 
The district court did not find Grant's story credible. 
He had stolen a car at gunpoint and led the police on 
a dangerous high-speed chase through densely 
populated neighborhoods. Once cornered, he 
attempted to escape. Once caught, he lied about his 
name. He lied twice more at booking and when 
hospitalized. 
In contrast, the district court found the testimony of 
the police officers believable, determining that it was 
unlikely that officers would beat Grant in front of 
other officers from different divisions. The court 
concluded that the events described by the officers 
were more plausible than those portrayed by Grant. 
To support his contentions, Grant emphasizes the 
testimony of expert witness Dr. James Styner, who 
testified that the breaks in Grant's fibulae were 
consistent with direct lateral blows caused by objects 
such as flashlights or batons, but were inconsistent 
with a vertical trauma such as a fall from a high wall. 
In Dr. Styner's opinion, Grant's bones were broken at 
some point after he fell from the six-foot wall, but not 
during the fall itself. Although the district court 
considered this evidence, it found that the breaks did 
not result from blows by the police officers, but 
rather from the impact of the car crash or, 
alternatively, from Grant's fall from the wall as he 
was attempting to flee from the officers. 
**4 Viewing the record in its entirety, and giving 
due weight to the district court's unique ability to 
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, we conclude 
that there was ample evidence to support the court's 
finding that Appellant's injuries were caused by a 
trauma other than the alleged blows inflicted by 
officers on the scene. 
IV. 
Appellant's final contention is that the district court 
erred by failing to clarify whether the police officers 
were exonerated on qualified immunity grounds, that 
is, that they acted in good-faith reliance on an official 
municipal policy, or on the ground that no 
constitutional violation occurred. Under Monell v. 
Dept. of Social Serv. of New York. 436 U.S. 658 
(1978), contends Appellant, the City could have been 
held liable for improper training of the officers 
notwithstanding the exoneration of the officers 
themselves if they had been exonerated on qualified 
immunity grounds. In order for liability to attach 
under Monell, a plaintiff must prove that the 
municipality caused in some meaningful sense the 
alleged constitutional harm through some official 
policy. Id. at 690. 
The problem with Appellant's position is that the 
district court clearly did not rest its judgment on 
qualified immunity grounds. Rather, it 
unequivocally held that there was no constitutional 
violation: "The court concludes that the force used in 
making the arrest was not 'excessive', and that 
therefore no constitutional violation occurred." E.R. 
at 59. 
Once the court determines that no constitutional 
violation occurred, the City can not be liable under 
Monell A finding that officers inflicted no 
constitutional injury on a plaintiff in a Section 1983 
action is not only conclusive as to the officers, but 
also as to the city and its police commission. City of 
LosAneeles v. Heller. 475 U.S. 796. 799 (1986). As 
the Court noted: 
If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at 
the hands of the individual police officer, the fact 
that the departmental regulations might have 
authorized the use of constitutionally excessive 
force is quite beside the point. 
Id We agree that "absent any constitutional 
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violations by the individual defendants, there can be 
no Monell liability." Palmerin v. City of Riverside, 
794 F.2d 1409, 1414 (9th Cir.1986) (citing Sanchez 
v. City of Riverside, 596 F.Supp. 193, 195 n. 3 
(C.D.Cal.1984)). 
V. 
We have considered all questions raised by 
Appellant. To the extent not discussed herein, any 
other contentions have been considered and rejected. 
AFFIRMED. 
FN* Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior Judge, 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, sitting by designation. 
FN** This disposition is not appropriate for 
publication and may not be cited to or by the 
courts of this circuit except as provided by 
Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 
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